Re: Why AI does not require Reductionism

From: Damien Broderick (d.broderick@english.unimelb.edu.au)
Date: Mon Jan 21 2002 - 20:55:16 MST


At 02:36 AM 1/21/02 -0800, Paul wrote:

>Penrose's argument rest on the assumption that we
>cannot reduce the 'source' of conciousness to physcial
>matter.

On the contrary, Penrose has no objections in principle to
machine-substrate conscious AI, *as long as it supports the same quantum
mysteries he thinks supervene upon microtubules [or whatever] in the human
nervous system*.

>At the core, regardless of any other details, we are
>all made of matter, which is itself governed by
>Quantum Mechanics and potential 'hidden variables'.

Well, forget the hidden variables, but Penrose plainly has no objection to
this general assertion (except that instead of `made of matter', a
pre-Einsteinian formulation, he might say, perhaps, `comprised of twistor
transactions in high-dimensional spaces').

Damien Broderick



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