From: James Rogers (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Thu Jul 04 2002 - 17:19:10 MDT
On 7/4/02 12:24 PM, "Peter Voss" <email@example.com> wrote:
> There is an important sense of 'freewill' that is both valid & useful.
> Valid, by being compatible with finite state machines, and useful for
> identifying (moral) responsibility. See:
> Comment on last sentence below: 'Perceive' perhaps, but we can certainly
> conceptualize our 'lack' of freewill.
I don't think I disagree with Peter at all here. We can certainly
conceptualize a lack of free will, or we wouldn't be having this discussion.
I can even be aware of the fact that any choice I may make is not made out
of "free will" but deterministic. My point is that even if we are
deterministic we can't predict our own behaviors with certainty, though an
entity with superior computational resources might be able to.
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