From: David Cake (email@example.com)
Date: Mon Jul 08 2002 - 07:06:18 MDT
At 1:57 PM +0200 8/7/02, Christian Szegedy scribbled:
>>I mostly agree with Chalmers' criticism of Penrose's consciousness-
>>must-be-quantum argument (section 3) and of his Gödel-based argument
>>against AI (section 1). Not sure yet what I think about Chalmers'
>>opinions, in section 2, about Penrose's second, neglected Gödel-type
>I think the Goedel-type arguments are neglected, because they are mostly
>uninteresting. To me, using Goedels theorem and its variants to
>speculate about the capabilities or limititations of AIs are simply naive
>>and completely miss the points.
I agree. You have to make some big and questionable
assumptions about human reasoning to arrive at a position where they
>The transitivity of strangeness can lead to obviously nonsense.
>but I have the exprience that it can lead to very interesting results if
>1) Both weird things are really unexplainable by standard methods,
>2) They share something common.
>None of them applies to your analogy.
The assumption that they have anything significant in common
is very speculative in this case.
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