**From:** Gary F. York (*gfyork@ix.netcom.com*)

**Date:** Mon Apr 28 2003 - 17:54:49 MDT

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From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>

*>
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*> "Ben Goertzel" <ben@goertzel.org> writes:
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*> > I can see that this Library of Babel metaverse is possible, but I'm not sure
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*> > why it's necessary...
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*>
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*> It is all around you by definition. We have:
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*>
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*> 1) A physics in which any given volume can only hold a finite number
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*> of possible states.
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*> 2) A physics that, thanks to quantum mechanics, generates nice even
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*> distributions of states.
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*> 3) Initial conditions that apparently consisted of (from the WMAP
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*> data) mostly uniform distribution of matter and a flat and thus
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*> infinite space filled with that matter.
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*>
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*> That means if you only go far enough, you'll eventually find a volume
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*> with any given configuration. This assumes that the universe is as the
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*> cosmologists currently believe it to be -- which might change with
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*> time, of course.
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*>
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*>
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*> --
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*> Perry E. Metzger perry@piermont.com
*

I'm unpersuaded for reasons I'll get to in a moment. I should confess that I

most particularly don't _want_ to be persuaded. Seems to me the implication is

utterly horrible: every evil, monstrous act that could conceivably be

perpetrated must have happened -- somewhere. For this to be true, every exact

doppelganger of me which exists at this time, N, there must be an infinite

number who 'choose' to do some completely irrational, horrible thing at time N +

1.

I don't think this is actually possible. If we consider the movement from time

N to N + 1 as a state change, my contention is that some state changes are

constrained. Any arrangement of atoms and molecules configured at time N as

_me_ is not, for instance, going to move at N + 1 to a state that cuts open the

next baby it sees to see if it likes the taste of baby heart. It's not just a

low probability event, it's a zero probability event.

The whole point of designing a 'friendly' AI is based on the presumption that

it's possible to succeed -- which means that the AI, designed properly in the

first instance, has zero chance of becoming unfriendly. At a lower level, if I

create a program to print out the integers, there are some ways I could err, but

it has zero chance of printing the works of Shakespeare instead.

Perhaps this is obvious.

The point is that estimating the maximum distance to my nearest doppelganger by

first computing the number of Hubble bubble's it would take to instantiate every

possible state within a Hubble bubble places an upper bound on the distance but

is very far from establishing that every imaginable configuration of states is a

_reachable_ state in state space under the state transition rules that represent

the laws of physics.

That I exist is an instance proof that there is at least one set of state

transitions that could lead from conditions at the beginning to me. So,

granting the assumptions, there may in fact be doppelgangers of me out there and

very likely much closer than the estimate given. (Because the number of

_reachable_ states in state space is very much less than the number of

imaginable states.)

But -- maybe not, either. The simplifying assumption leading to the

doppelganger hypothesis was nearly uniform mass distribution and infinite space

containing, logically, an infinite number of Hubble Bubbles with _exactly_

identical initial particle distributions. The presumption seems to be that

given identical mass distributions, events would proceed, deterministically, in

identical ways, thus leading to doppelgangers for those volumes with initial

distributions (and temperatures) equal to our own.

There is at least one unstated assumption: that position, relative to the center

of the inflation, has no influence on subsequent events and that, therefore,

it's reasonable to expect particle interaction to proceed identically in

different 'equivalent' bubbles. This might be true. But it might not be true,

too.

I certainly don't have the math or physics to understand the inflationary

universe idea with any depth. Still, it seems that if we stipulate inflation,

there is _some_ equivalent of motion and, if so, every particle might have it's

own unique starting vector so that even if 'initial conditions' were

positionally equivalent for two distinct volumes at some early time T, then

those two volumes would be positionally _much_ different at time T + 1.

Even if I'm utterly wet in this instance, surely one among you can propose

something plausible that leads neither to horror nor unimaginably tedious

redundancy.

G.

Gary F. York

gfyork@ix.netcom.com

**Next message:**Emil Gilliam: "META: Chit-chat"**Previous message:**Gary Miller: "RE: No posts for a while. read this at our leisure (if you do at all) Peace Jonathan B.D. Standley"**In reply to:**Perry E. Metzger: "Re: Infinite universe"**Next in thread:**Mikko Rauhala: "Re: Infinite universe"**Reply:**Mikko Rauhala: "Re: Infinite universe"**Reply:**Eliezer S. Yudkowsky: "Re: Infinite universe"**Messages sorted by:**[ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]

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