RE: On the subjective experience of consciousness

From: Ben Goertzel (ben@goertzel.org)
Date: Mon Mar 29 2004 - 14:30:42 MST


Paul, the quote you mistakenly attribute to me in your post is actually
from Jef Albright, not from me

My own perspective on consciousness is given in my article

http://www.goertzel.org/dynapsyc/2004/HardProblem.htm

-- Ben Goertzel

> --- Ben Goertzel <ben@goertzel.org> wrote:
> >
> > > A purely mechanistic third person account of
> > conscious experience has
> > > all the observable attributes and characteristics
> > of a first person
> > > account. But the third-person account is simpler
> > and more
> > > consistent,
> > > therefore preferable as an explanation. There is
> > no reason to
> > > hypothesize some mysterious state to explain our
> > first-person
> > > experience
> > > of consciousness. Of course it *feels* the way it
> > does.
>
> I would disagree. If we examine this problem using
> the 'easy problem of consciousness' your remarks are
> self-consistent concurrently with Ben G's assement of
> simplicity in regards to the context from which we
> examine it.
>
> However, from the 'hard problem of consciousness' your
> perspective doesn't resolve the problematic issues
> raised by it, it simply reverts back to the 'easy
> problem of consciousness', which fails miserably to
> address the hard problem.
>
> Paul Hughes



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