From: BillK (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Thu Jul 01 2004 - 07:56:18 MDT
On Thu, 1 Jul 2004 20:47:59 +0800, Metaqualia <email@example.com> wrote:
> >Why are you using the term 'qualia' to describe some perfectly ordinary
> >physical processes?
> Because I am not describing ordinary physical processes, but, qualia.
Of course, but you are making the very big assumption that qualia
I am quite entitled to say that they are only a figment of your imagination.
Because, by definition, that is what you claim that your 'qualia' are.
Daniel Dennett seems to be the main opponent of the qualia school at present.
Dennett's argument revolves around the central objection that, for
qualia to be taken seriously as a component of experience—for them to
even make sense as a discrete concept—it must be possible to show that
a) it is possible to know that a change in qualia has occurred, as
opposed to a change in something else;
b) there is a difference between having a change in qualia and not
Dennett attempts to show that we cannot satisfy (a) either through
introspection or through observation, and that qualia's very
definition undermines its chances of satisfying (b).
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