From: Ben Goertzel (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Sat Nov 26 2005 - 11:41:58 MST
> Ben, you're framing the question as if there's an objective basis for
> subjective "continuity of consciousness."
I believe there is such an objective basis, even though our current
science of mind is not deep enough to tell us much about this basis.
By an objective basis, I mean a reductionist explanation for under
what conditions a mind will describe itself as having the subjective
experience of "continuity of consciousness."
In the case of a series of mindstates transitioning between M and N,
it is possible that M will describe itself as having the subjective
experience of "continuity of consciousness" but N will not. In this
case, the kind of "continuous awareness thread" I was talking about
It may be that a theorem-proving-based Friendly mind would not have
the subjective experience of "continuity of consciousness" but this is
far from demonstrated. My guess is that such a mind *would* have such
an experience, although it would also be acutely aware of the
limitations of this experience as a summary of what goes on inside its
mind, and would also have many other forms of subjective experience
that we cannot currently conceive.
-- Ben G
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