From: Stathis Papaioannou (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Sun Feb 25 2007 - 15:22:16 MST
This argument has, of course, been rehashed in recent years by Roger Penrose
in his two books, "The Emperor's New Mind" and "Shadows of the Mind".
Penrose believes on this basis that not even *weak* AI is possible. (Even
John Searle thinks it's trivially obvious weak AI is possible.) One problem
with the Lucas/Penrose idea is that a Godel-type sentence can be written
about Lucas or Penrose which they can't prove, putting them in the same
league as the digital computer.
On 2/26/07, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh <email@example.com> wrote:
> What's wrong with this argument<http://users.ox.ac.uk/%7Ejrlucas/Godel/mmg.html>?!!!
> If it's true, making a (supper)human is impossible!
> *Minds, Machines and Gödel* is J. R. Lucas<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Lucas_%28philosopher%29>'s
> 1959 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1959> philosophical paper in which he
> argues that a human mathematician
> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematician>cannot be accurately
> represented by an algorithmic automaton<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_machine>.
> Appealing to Gödel's incompleteness theorem<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorem>,
> he argues that for any such automaton, there would be some mathematical
> formula which it could not prove, but which the human mathematician could
> both see, and show, to be true.
> The paper is a Gödelian argument<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mechanism_%28philosophy%29#G.C3.B6delian_arguments>over mechanism.
> Mohsen Ravanbakhsh,
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