From: Stathis Papaioannou (stathisp@gmail.com)
Date: Mon Aug 20 2007 - 04:10:50 MDT
On 20/08/07, Randall Randall <randall@randallsquared.com> wrote:
>
> On Aug 19, 2007, at 8:04 PM, Matt Mahoney wrote:
> >
> > I mean consciousness as that which distinguishes people from
> > philosophical
> > zombies.
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
>
> But is there any reason to think that the concept of a
> philosophical zombie makes any sense? In order for it
> to make sense, you have to have found that consciousness
> isn't a physical process. Do you believe you have
> evidence for this view?
It's logically possible that consciousness is due to a physical
process, but a different physical process might result in no
consciousness or different consciousness despite similar external
behaviour.
-- Stathis Papaioannou
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