From: Lee Corbin (email@example.com)
Date: Sun Mar 02 2008 - 13:54:22 MST
> The point, I think, is that it seems like there should be an objective
> fact of the matter as to whether some physical system is having
> conscious experiences;
> but if computation is sufficient for experience, since what a physical
> system is computing is subjective, this can't be the case.
Oh, why not? Perhaps there is a terminological problem here, but
to the physical system in question, of course the computation yields
(subjective) experience. What a system is computing is objective,
naturally, but the "consciousness" experienced, that old murky
problem, "as seen from inside" by a device is all that is subjective.
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