Re: Separate Copies Contribute Separately to One's Runtime

From: Lee Corbin (
Date: Fri Mar 07 2008 - 12:30:34 MST

Nick writes

> Lee Corbin wrote:
>> No, as causally separate process, each is separately conscious,
>> even if isomorphic (according to me).
> What's the difference in anticipated experience between this and them
> not being separate?
> )

Sorry, I don't quite understand the question, nor the relevance of
Eliezer's post.

Whose anticipated experience? The subjects? In their own boxes
they'll each have experience. I thought the question was whether
those experiences should be completely *identified*, that is,
regarded as one and the same experience. (My answer was no,
they should not be, since they're causally separate processes
that might even be light years apart.)

But perhaps you mean *our* experiences, as onlookers? Well,
we see two processes that are completely identical, e.g., two
computer runs of exactly the same program. It also so happens
that to us they're separate, separated either in time or space.
Still not sure I've covered what you were driving at.


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