Re: Separate Copies Contribute Separately to One's Runtime

From: Nick Tarleton (nickptar@gmail.com)
Date: Fri Mar 07 2008 - 13:25:09 MST


On Fri, Mar 7, 2008 at 2:30 PM, Lee Corbin <lcorbin@rawbw.com> wrote:
> Nick writes
> > Lee Corbin wrote:
> >
> >> No, as causally separate process, each is separately conscious,
> >> even if isomorphic (according to me).
> >
> > What's the difference in anticipated experience between this and them
> > not being separate?
> > http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/07/making-beliefs-.html )
>
> Sorry, I don't quite understand the question, nor the relevance of
> Eliezer's post.
>
> Whose anticipated experience? The subjects? In their own boxes
> they'll each have experience. I thought the question was whether
> those experiences should be completely *identified*, that is,
> regarded as one and the same experience. (My answer was no,
> they should not be, since they're causally separate processes
> that might even be light years apart.)

This is what I mean. Is there a difference in what the subjects would
experience if you're right about separateness vs. if you're wrong?



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