Re: Separate Copies Contribute Separately to One's Runtime

From: Matt Mahoney (matmahoney@yahoo.com)
Date: Fri Mar 07 2008 - 14:48:01 MST


--- "Eliezer S. Yudkowsky" <sentience@pobox.com> wrote:

> Nick Tarleton wrote:
> > On Fri, Mar 7, 2008 at 9:23 AM, Lee Corbin <lcorbin@rawbw.com> wrote:
> >> No, as causally separate process, each is separately conscious,
> >> even if isomorphic (according to me).
> >
> > What's the difference in anticipated experience between this and them
> > not being separate? (
> > http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/07/making-beliefs-.html )
>
> If you flip a fair quantum coin, have your exoself generate 100
> separated isomorphic copies of you conditional on the coin coming up
> heads, then, when (all of) you are about to look at the coin, should
> your subjective anticipation of seeing "heads" be 1:1 or 100:1?
>
> This is a question that confuses even me, btw.

It is analogous to asking out of all possible universes, what is the
probability of observing a universe that supports intelligent life? The
confusion arises from inappropriately applying probability theory as a model
of uncertainty. They are different things.

-- Matt Mahoney, matmahoney@yahoo.com



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