Re: Separate Copies Contribute Separately to One's Runtime

From: Stathis Papaioannou (
Date: Fri Mar 07 2008 - 18:37:13 MST

On 08/03/2008, Eliezer S. Yudkowsky <> wrote:

> If you flip a fair quantum coin, have your exoself generate 100
> separated isomorphic copies of you conditional on the coin coming up
> heads, then, when (all of) you are about to look at the coin, should
> your subjective anticipation of seeing "heads" be 1:1 or 100:1?

It seems straightforward if you think about it from a MWI perspective.
When the coin is flipped the world splits in two, with one world
containing 100 versions of you looking at heads while the other
contains one version of you looking at tails. You are then 100 times
as likely to find yourself one of the versions looking at heads.
Another observer, however, has an equal subjective chance of ending up
in either world.

Stathis Papaioannou

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