From: Mike Dougherty (email@example.com)
Date: Sun Mar 16 2008 - 12:14:58 MDT
On Sun, Mar 16, 2008 at 10:46 AM, Lee Corbin <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
> Few people would or should make that claim. But then, what you
> are trying to explain is what the "nuances" really amount to.
I am suggesting that their value is negligible and probably do not
need to be preserved.
> > electromagnetic storage constraints). However, the bandwidth
> > bringing data into your 'brain' can exceed the bandwidth to
> At least. And though we are just discussing principle, there
> are the other senses that should be given passing mention.
I assumed bandwidth covers the sum of all senses.
> second re-reading, I get it. That is, for example, do I squint so
> that the incoming bandwidth isn't any greater than the bandwidth
> to my memory? (There's another sentence that could have been
> restated and embroidered with "That is...", or "In other words..."
Noted- your preferential framing protocol for idea restatement or summary.
> flow), or trying to skim written material IN ORDER TO notice
> less of it----ah! Thanks! Yes I do. Often, especially with pages
> I already read or which seem overly redundant I have found,
> as per your prediction, that I can more accurately "remember
> what I perceive".
This goes to my point about how much memory is required or is even
> But still, if I take your question above quite literally, the answer
> still is no, I think. BTW, what has this to do with Memory
> Merging Possible for Close Duplicates?
I agree that the answer should be no. Along the same intention of
maximizing runtime should be maximizing resolution and bandwidth.
There is also a point to be made here for the idea that intelligent
compression allows a larger volume of data to be written to memory
through the fixed-bandwidth channel. That's a different topic though,
and you're already asking what this line of thinking has to do with
the subject of close duplicates.
What determines how close a duplicate is to the original? Whether the
TE uses teleportation or computronium uploads, the principle measure
of identity is ... what exactly? It seems that often it is memories
that are used to determine identity up to the point of copy, and that
instances diverge from each other because of their new memories. I
think the "what is identity" question is endemic to this "Close
duplicates" discussion but it quickly turns into a distracting
quagmire from which there is no return. It seems there are others
here who believe memory is not the sole measure of identity, which
gives rise to a completely different view of what a close duplicate
I ask about the relationship between experience of an event and memory
of the event because it is relevant to how memory can be merged
without losing the ability to reconstruct the experience. I would
have to start a separate thread to discuss what it means to believe in
a memory as experience, which (like the identity question) is relevant
I argue that it should not cause cognitive dissonance to say, "I went
to the movies" at the same time "I went to the bookstore" (to use your
original analogy) because both copies have a belief in their identity
as Me. I also currently believe that each copy, for the duration that
each existed, was Me. As long as I am not bound by a belief that my
identity can only exist as a linear series of experience, there is no
problem with being several simultaneous duplicates. Is that a clearer
statement of support for my original assessment that close duplicates
should merge at least as easily as they are created?
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