From: Jeff L Jones (email@example.com)
Date: Sun Mar 16 2008 - 16:21:20 MDT
On Sun, Mar 16, 2008 at 1:27 AM, Vladimir Nesov <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
> If my copy that might have observed "heads" is destroyed with
> probability 90% instead of being copied 100 times, it reformulates the
> question. Now the question is not just about the coin "if the coin
> came up heads", it's "if the coin that you will observe came up heads"
> that includes parts about the coin, and parts about agent body. In
> this case what happened to the body does matter, it's a part of the
> territory that question addresses. If body is destroyed with
> probability 90% in event of coin coming up "heads", only 55% of
> original probability mass corresponds to situations where there is a
> body. The fact that I'm doing the reasoning tells me that a surviving
> body is on the territory, so the world is in those 55% or original
> probability mass. Given this fact, I conclude that probability of coin
> coming up "heads" is 1/11.
So you agree with me in the case of conditionally destroying copies,
but not in the case of conditionally creating copies? I don't
understand how you could come to two different conclusions there.
It's the same thing going on. The question is about what you will
see, not about "what will happen". More specifically, I think the
question is about what the best thing for you to anticipate seeing is.
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