Re: The GLUT and functionalism

From: Stathis Papaioannou (
Date: Tue Mar 18 2008 - 05:57:30 MDT

On 18/03/2008, Lee Corbin <> wrote:

> > Now, suppose the first operator transfers the final state of his
> > machine *as well as* every other possible state, again not telling
> > which is which, and the second operator just happens to choose the
> > right state to input. Is there interruption of consciousness?
> No interruption. The last state on the Australian machine is
> identical to the first state on the Vienna machine.

Sorry for labouring the point (I'd be surprised if anyone other than
you and I have followed the thread this far) but I intended that there
be no overlap. The Australian operator reads the last state S(n) of
his machine, and transfers this information to the Vienna operator who
works out (from knowledge of the machine's operation) that he must
start up his machine in state S(n+1). In this way the combined
machines + operators can reliably carry out the same computations as a
single machine. But if the Australian operator simply provides a list
of all possible states, knowing but not telling which one is S(n),
that seems to me exactly the same as providing no information at all;
i.e. the same as if the Vienna operator knew nothing about the
antipodean device and simply tried random states, one of them just
happening to be S(n+1). How does this affect whether consciousness is

Stathis Papaioannou

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