From: Nick Tarleton (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Mon Apr 07 2008 - 18:07:03 MDT
On Mon, Apr 7, 2008 at 7:48 PM, Matt Mahoney <email@example.com> wrote:
> No, this is the same problem as the quantum coin. Subjective expectation for
> rational agents requires multiple trials and counting outcomes.
I can only anticipate things that have happened to me before, multiple
> If you are
> copied 100 times when a coin comes up heads, then there is a subjective 99%
> chance of heads because after multiple trials that is what you are most likely
> to remember. In the case of teleportation I end up at point B every time,
> independent of the method used to kill the copy at A. If you believe you
> might be tortured, then that belief is based on faith rather than experience.
Reasoning based on knowledge of what the teleporter does and some
reasonable assumptions about philosophy of mind is faith?
> Faith says that you are going to step into a booth and be crushed with 100%
> probability, so you will probably pay the $2. But after repeating enough
> times and always ending up at B, you will at some point decide to save the
How do you know what *I* would do?
> If you prefer, think of teleportation as equivalent to being tortured and then
> having the memory of the torture erased. This has zero utility to a rational
> agent because there is no change in mental state.
I can't care about things I won't remember? Then I can't care about
anything, because I won't remember anything when I'm dead.
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Wed May 22 2013 - 04:01:25 MDT