From: Stuart Armstrong (email@example.com)
Date: Sat Apr 19 2008 - 14:23:48 MDT
> > > I guess my question would be why you value your life more than your
> > > copy's, if you are both identiical aside from a few neurons here and
> > > there? They both should have roughly the same value to you.
To answer your question from my personal perspective: My personal code
of ethics is what I believe would be better for the world. My actual
behaviour is more complicated, parasited by actions that are better
for me personally.
Therefore, after all these arguments, I believe that there would be no
ethical problem with destructive teleportation with instant
destruction. I'm also pretty convinced that teleportation with a ten
second delay before destruction is fine, maybe even if the "original"
is conscious and aware during that time.
However, I would not accept to be that ten second delayed one, and
then be destroyed (and so I would not put myself through the procedure
in the first place, as that ends up with some version of me put in
that position). My fear of death is reduced by the knowledge that
there is another copy of me out there - but only slightly. Not enough
to make me accept my destruction without major incentives. (in terms
of your question: both copies have same value for me before the split,
but after the split, the "me" who is destined to be destroyed would
overvalue himself over the other one. If there was arena, they'd fight
each other for survival).
So, if I was an MP, I would probably vote to allow most forms of
destructive teleportation if the issue came up - but would be
terrified of trying them out myself.
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