From: Tim Freeman (email@example.com)
Date: Mon Sep 08 2008 - 22:45:46 MDT
From: "Wei Dai" <firstname.lastname@example.org>
>It's not true that the period of "irrationality" (I put it in quotes because
>it's irrational according to standard decision theory, but not according to
>common sense) has to be short.
You could be right, but I don't think your example supports your conclusion.
>Suppose the merged AI starts trying to convert the universe to
>paperclips based on a coin toss, but after doing 10% of the universe,
>realizes that the staples goal has a much higher chance of success,
>which it didn't know at the beginning. I think the two original AIs
>would have agreed that in this circumstance the merged AI should flip
>another coin to decide whether or not to switch goals.
I think the two original AI's would have agreed that the merged AI
should go for staples without any coin flip, and symmetrically if the
coin flip had dictated a conversion to paperclips that was later
discovered to be infeasible.
So after the coin flip, the utility function for the merged AI might
be "51 for a universe of 60% staples, or 49 for a universe of 60%
paperclips, or nothing if I don't get enough staples or enough
paperclips". Swap the numbers if the coin flip comes out the other
I have no intuition at this point -- there might be some other example
that does support your conclusion, but I can't see it right now, nor
can I see a path to proving that irrationality from negotiation should
-- Tim Freeman http://www.fungible.com email@example.com
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