Re: [sl4] Uploads coming first would be good, right?

From: Krekoski Ross (
Date: Wed Feb 04 2009 - 18:56:44 MST

In fact, this is true even of classical information if we assume that we
have a true state independant of being observed.

On Thu, Feb 5, 2009 at 9:29 AM, Krekoski Ross <>wrote:

> Of course, for what its worth, strictly exact copies down to the quantum
> level are impossible.
> On Thu, Feb 5, 2009 at 5:41 AM, Charles Hixson <
> > wrote:
>> OK. Let me try again in different words.
>> "Me" is those things I can exert control over. When I drive, the car is a
>> part of me. This is (more or less) confirmed by brain scans. When a
>> chimpanzee uses a tool, it sees that tool as a part of itself. In this
>> sense, my near future is also a part of me. I can control what's going to
>> happen (to some reasonable extent).
>> Mine is those things I claim the right to exert control over (to some
>> extent). (My wife would certainly question my right to exert very much
>> control. So would my dog, though to a lesser extent.)
>> Who I am is not an all-or-nothing kind of relation. My hand remains my
>> hand, even if I loose it in an accident. If I'm lucky and quick it can be
>> reattached.
>> Therefore, position the "transporter" as described, I (present) would
>> decline to use it because I don't want to be tortured to death. And, as
>> described, the I before transmission would, indeed, be tortured to death,
>> even though an I would survive that did not experience that. At the time
>> after the "transport" has occurred, the two entities have become separate.
>> They no longer experience each other as indistinguishable. However, before
>> the transport they were indistinguishable, due to identity.
>> In the brain scans of animals (and to a much lesser extent of people)
>> tests show that during the use of a tool, the tool is considered a part of
>> the body. When you feel with a stick, you are feeling with the stick, not
>> with your fingers. Because that's how the brain records it. At that point
>> the stick is indistinguishable from you. When you drop it, you also drop
>> the connection. Then it is seen as separate.
>> There's nothing mysterious about it, though I may have explained things
>> poorly. It's a function of how and what the brain (i.e., the mind operating
>> within the brain) records the stimuli.
>> Vladimir Nesov wrote:
>>> On Wed, Feb 4, 2009 at 3:44 AM, Andrew Hay <> wrote:
>>>> "all sufficiently indistinguishable versions of myself are me" seems to
>>>> be a
>>>> rather strong statement without the required strong evidence/reasoning
>>>> backing it up.
>>>> Not that I'm helping, because I don't know the answer. Perhaps it is a
>>>> fault
>>>> at 'indistinguishable'? in any case, I can't be safe to assume that
>>>> unless
>>>> we have a good understanding of what the meaning behind "me" is.
>>> Concepts are definitions, following regularities in the world, and
>>> humans assign (context-sensitive) instrumental utility to the concepts
>>> according to role of those regularities in overall structure of the
>>> world, from the contexts in which the concepts apply. When we are
>>> talking about "me", there is instrumental utility attached, and this
>>> instrumental utility won't translate well to different regularities,
>>> or to different contexts in which this regularity is placed. I say
>>> "instrumental" in the sense of being a component in representation of
>>> the utility over whole timelines, even though things marked
>>> instrumental this way may be seen as terminal values.
>>> One of the core properties of the concept "me" is that it's singular
>>> (at any time). When the concept changes to accommodate the possibility
>>> of multiple people, so should its instrumental utility. It doesn't
>>> follow that when there are multiple identical people, each of them is
>>> as valuable from your or anyone's perspective as the single original.
>>> Maybe so, maybe not, but no easy answer. We don't need the
>>> understanding of "me", "me" doesn't apply. We need the understanding
>>> of values, as applied to the discussed context.

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