From: Frank Adamek (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Wed Dec 02 2009 - 19:19:01 MST
Experience consists of electrochemical signals conveyed to the auditory cortex, the visual cortex, etc that make up your brain, quite independently of whether similar or identical signals are traveling through a similar or identical brain somewhere else. If that brain is destroyed, no more signals reach it.
If you mean to say more than "there will be an instance of me with all my memories who experienced no gap in consciousness", what is it that allows you to experience what they experience? If a few memories are changed, do you experience it a little bit less, and where is the line between that person (the future instance of everything that allows us to call you "you") and some stranger, such that you expect the experiences of one and not the other? To me an expectation for the experiences of other instances of the self seems based off a non-physical "self-ness", either a property of certain minds that allows your current brain access to them, or a disembodied self-ness that receives everything each instance of you does, surviving beyond the destruction of each.
--- On Wed, 12/2/09, Stathis Papaioannou <email@example.com> wrote:
I would not
mind if my program is terminated today if I could be sure that it
would run again at some future time, since I would experience no gap
in consciousness; nor would I be aware from inside the program of any
change in processor speed.
-- Stathis Papaioannou
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