From: Stathis Papaioannou (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Thu Dec 03 2009 - 03:32:21 MST
2009/12/3 John McNamara <email@example.com>:
> If one of us happened to be dead the instant after duplication it
> would not effect the remaining me's thoughts on the situation. It
> would be the same as if one of us was ran over by a bus upon exiting
> the clinic.
No, it wouldn't be the same. If one of the copies dies instantly after
duplication it would be as if that copy had never been made. Consider
1. I do nothing.
2. I gather together the chemicals that would be used to make a copy
of you, then destroy them.
3. I assemble the chemicals to make a copy of you, but at a low
temperature so that its metabolism is suspended, then destroy it.
4. I allow the copy to warm up so that metabolic processes start up
for a microsecond, then destroy it.
5. I allow the copy to wake up, talk to it for a few minutes so that
it realises what's going on, then destroy it.
1 to 4 are equivalent: there is no termination of a stream of
consciousness, no aggrieved party. But 5 is murder.
-- Stathis Papaioannou
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