From: Stathis Papaioannou (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Thu Dec 03 2009 - 15:16:09 MST
2009/12/4 Frank Adamek <email@example.com>
> I don't think that my consciousness relies on such a low level of matter, that of atoms and molecules. My guess is the stability of the neurons and their synaptic connections and strengths makes me the same person from moment to moment. Considering the gradual replacement of components in neurons, I don't consider these things to be destroyed over time. With regard to duplication and destruction, is your best estimate that copying the configuration of cells and synapses is sufficient to make another instance of you? This would be the same as my belief that it is that level of organization which makes me "me".
But why would instant replacement of the brain be a problem if gradual
> I admit that it it is possible for subjective experience to be an illusion, and that perhaps we are never justified in expecting to experience the future. I have no strong evidence against this proposition. However, I also have no strong evidence for this proposition. Considering that a life of subjective experience could be at stake, I have a very large preference for a cautious approach in my own uploading.
My present physical body won't be around in a year's time, but there
will be another body made up of different matter in approximately the
same configuration, which will consider itself to be me. These are the
facts of the matter. Whether we say that I survive this process or
that there is only the illusion of survival is a matter of semantics,
and makes no difference to how I feel about myself or my future
-- Stathis Papaioannou
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Tue Jun 18 2013 - 04:01:04 MDT