From: Stathis Papaioannou (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Fri Dec 04 2009 - 00:02:39 MST
2009/12/4 Frank Adamek <email@example.com>
> > But why would instant replacement of the brain be a problem if gradual
> > replacement isn't?
> That is to say: I put a high probability on the idea that my brain is not gradually replaced, at the relevant level of organization.
But your brain is gradually replaced by the cellular repair
mechanisms. Over the course of a year almost all the matter in it is
replaced. What difference would it make if the replacement happened
all at once on a periodic basis, for example?
> > I admit that it it is possible for subjective experience to be an illusion, and that perhaps we are never justified in expecting to experience the future. I have no strong evidence against this proposition. However, I also have no strong evidence for this proposition. Considering that a life of subjective experience could be at stake, I have a very large preference for a cautious approach in my own uploading.
> > My present physical body won't be around in a year's time, but there
> > will be another body made up of different matter in approximately the
> > same configuration, which will consider itself to be me. These are the
> > facts of the matter. Whether we say that I survive this process or
> > that there is only the illusion of survival is a matter of semantics,
> > and makes no difference to how I feel about myself or my future
> > prospects.
> I agree that those are the objective facts of the matter. That this is a merely semantic difference to you displays that either you do not believe in a subjective experience, or that you have no concern for it. With regards to your own life I have no problem with the second (no snide remark just a support for self-determination), but for any who might care about the subjective, it seems dangerous and lacking in sufficient evidence to assume that it does not exist.
I believe in subjective experience and I think it's the most important
thing in the world. But I don't think there is any logical difference
between actually being the same person from day to day or - all else
being equal - only having the illusion of being the same person from
day to day.
-- Stathis Papaioannou
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