From: Jef Allbright (jef@jefallbright.net)
Date: Tue Dec 13 2005 - 21:32:17 MST
On 12/13/05, Michael Vassar <michaelvassar@hotmail.com> wrote:
> The same confusion relates to the discussion of the categorical imperative.
> The categorical imperative simply makes no sense for an AI. It doesn't tell
> the AI what to want universally done. Rational entities WILL do what their
> goal system tells them to do. They don't need "ethics" in the human sense
> of rules countering other inclinations. What they need is inclinations
> compatible with ours.
Let me see if I can understand what you're saying here. Do you mean
that to the extent an agent is rational, it will naturally use all of
its instrumental knowledge to promote its own goals and from its point
of view there would be no question that such action is good?
If this is true, then would it also see increasing its objective
knowledge in support of its goals as rational and inherently good
(from its point of view?)
If I'm still understanding the implications of what you said, would
this also mean that cooperation with other like-minded agents, to the
extent that this increased the promotion of its own goals, would be
rational and good (from its point of view?)
If this makes sense, then I think you may be on to an effective and
rational way of looking at decision-making about "right" and "wrong"
that avoids much of the contradiction of conventional views of
morality.
- Jef
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