From: Tennessee Leeuwenburg (tennessee@tennessee.id.au)
Date: Tue Dec 13 2005 - 21:53:08 MST
Jef Allbright wrote:
>On 12/13/05, Michael Vassar <michaelvassar@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>>The same confusion relates to the discussion of the categorical imperative.
>>The categorical imperative simply makes no sense for an AI. It doesn't tell
>>the AI what to want universally done. Rational entities WILL do what their
>>goal system tells them to do. They don't need "ethics" in the human sense
>>of rules countering other inclinations. What they need is inclinations
>>compatible with ours.
>>
>>
>
>Let me see if I can understand what you're saying here. Do you mean
>that to the extent an agent is rational, it will naturally use all of
>its instrumental knowledge to promote its own goals and from its point
>of view there would be no question that such action is good?
>
>If this is true, then would it also see increasing its objective
>knowledge in support of its goals as rational and inherently good
>(from its point of view?)
>
>If I'm still understanding the implications of what you said, would
>this also mean that cooperation with other like-minded agents, to the
>extent that this increased the promotion of its own goals, would be
>rational and good (from its point of view?)
>
>If this makes sense, then I think you may be on to an effective and
>rational way of looking at decision-making about "right" and "wrong"
>that avoids much of the contradiction of conventional views of
>morality.
>
>- Jef
>
>
Perhaps I can simplify this argument.
The Categorical Imperative theory is an "is" not an "ought".
Cheers,
-T
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