Separate Copies Contribute Separately to One's Runtime

From: Lee Corbin (
Date: Fri Mar 07 2008 - 07:23:46 MST

Krekoski writes

> Lets say though that somehow, an abstraction of my atomic structure/energy
> is sufficient for consciousness, that such structure is conscious in and of itself.

(I myself would say that it must get runtime, i.e., be executed on a computer,
biological, or silicon, or other, in order to be conscious. Frozen data, stored
somewhere in a warehouse, no matter how detailed, are not conscious.)

> What if we were to create n clones of me, utilizing this abstraction as input
> into a program, lets further say that such clones are implemented in a computer
> program, and all are subject to the same internal environment.


> Lets also say that each clone is housed in a small computer, maybe
> 10cm x 10cm x 10cm in size. It's not important. If we create several
> instantiations of this program, several of these computers so to speak,
> and housed them in the same building. would there only be one
> instantiation of consciousness,

No, as causally separate process, each is separately conscious,
even if isomorphic (according to me).

> given that its the same structure, even though each instantiation of
> this structure is not causally interactive with any of the others, or
> are there multiple consciousnesses?

Let's say that you are being implemented on Earth right now by
a computer (we live in a local simulation), and there is an identical
you being emulated *exactly* identically on a computer around
Proxima Centauri. These processes are outside each other's
light cone, and are causally distinct. "You" at Proxima are unaffected
by, say, the unfortunate demise of "you" on Earth.


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