From: Krekoski Ross (email@example.com)
Date: Thu Mar 06 2008 - 23:50:22 MST
> > The decimal expansion of pi looks random but contains any string of
> > digits you care to nominate....it contains islands of structure hidden
> > in the noise. If these islands of structure contain observers, they will
> > be no less conscious for the fact that an observer outside the ensemble
> > can't find them.
Thats an interesting thesis, but somewhat akin to saying, isn't it, that my
DNA is aware since it contains the code necessary to generate me, given a
program to execute it. I dont think that information is akin to
consciousness, or even computation for that matter. The two are
fundamentally different processes.
For example, if I were to swallow tetrodotoxin or some other neurotoxin, I
would quickly die, but the fundamental structure of my brain would remain
unchanged for some time. I dont think that 'I' would remain conscious until
my brain started to decay.
similarly, if I were to describe the position of every atom in my body with
a specific number, that number would not exhibit conscious in and of itself.
but even if it did, are all the possibly polymorphisms of that digit
conscious in precisely the same way? a reversal of the number, subjecting
the number to any one of several information-preserving compression
algorithms, or reducing that number to its lowest possible KC value by some
Lets say though that somehow, an abstraction of my atomic structure/energy
is sufficient for consciousness, that such structure is conscious in and of
itself. What if we were to create n clones of me, utilizing this abstraction
as input into a program, lets further say that such clones are implemented
in a computer program, and all are subject to the same internal environment.
lets also say that each clone is housed in a small computer, maybe 10cm x
10cm x 10cm in size. its not important. If we create several instantiations
of this program, several of these computers so to speak, and housed them in
the same building. would there only be one instantiation of consciousness,
given that its the same structure, even though each instantiation of this
structure is not causally interactive with any of the others, or are there
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