Re: Separate Copies Contribute Separately to One's Runtime

From: Stathis Papaioannou (
Date: Fri Mar 07 2008 - 20:24:43 MST

On 08/03/2008, Eliezer S. Yudkowsky <> wrote:

> Okay, so, after I all see the coin - in an algorithmically isomorphic
> way - merge my separated copies.
> Oh, look, by briefly expending a bit of extra computing power, I can
> control the outcome of coinflips - though not in a way that any
> watcher would detect.
> Unverifiable psychic powers! I can see them, but you can't! What fun...

 The problem has to do with the fact that we believe there is one, and
only one, version of us that persists through time. This is shown to
be objectively false when multiple copies are involved, but our minds
try to interpret the situation as if it's true. In fact, it isn't even
true if there is only one copy: why should I care about the
experiences of some guy who will wake up in my bed tomorrow and think
he's me, let alone some guy who wakes up as an upload and thinks he's
me? So-called paradoxes of personal identity are due to the fact that
thought experiments such as these screw with our psychology. Physics
and logic remain unaffected.

Stathis Papaioannou

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