Re: Separate Copies Contribute Separately to One's Runtime

From: Lee Corbin (
Date: Sat Mar 08 2008 - 22:23:58 MST

Stathis writes

>> I claim that isomorphic copies separated enough in spacetime
>> to constitute separate physical processes are separate subjects.

BTW, the word "subject" here is so prone to miscommunication
that I've withdrawn the sentence, in accordance with a post by
Mikko who complained "This is rather nonsensical to me."

>> Suppose that there is an absolutely identical you being held
>> in an Earth-like simulated city near Sirius. It ought to matter
>> to you that one of them is going to shortly die.
> I agree that there are two separate subjects, but I don't agree that
> it matters if one of them dies. This is because, if you're the one
> that dies, it will seem to you that you continue to live in the one
> that survives.

Naturally, I oppose the construction "if you are the one that dies"
because I consider you to be both of them. As you know, I
think that it's possible to be in two places at the same time,
just as it's possible to be at two times in the same place. (We
simply need to get used to the idea.)

> If you disagree with this, then you should consider
> destructive teleportation to be suicide.

Sequence of events in what I think you mean by destructive
teleportation. (This includes the more shocking case of
Teleportation With Delay.)

1. You step into the booth in LA and are scanned.
2. The information is sent to New York, where, using
    different atoms, a duplicate you is created that is
    identical to the person (object) that was scanned
3. The LA original sees his duplicate in NY walk out
    of the NY booth, and knows that he-in-LA will be
    disintegrated in 30 seconds (after the transfer has
    been triple checked for validity).
4. The LA original sweats profusely if he's not up to
    speed on all this (IMO), because always before
    in his memory he walked out of the remote booth.
5. The LA original is disintegrated.

Why would I mind traveling like that? I'm used to the ideas,
and while I-in-LA would be surprised (of course) to find
his instance still in LA, I-in-LA would say, "oh well, no
biggie, the I-in-NY will wake up in my bed tomorrow,
and, according to every possible objective criterion, is
none other than me (despite the difference of a few seconds
of memories)."


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