From: Stathis Papaioannou (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Sun Mar 09 2008 - 01:45:28 MST
On 09/03/2008, Lee Corbin <email@example.com> wrote:
> >> Suppose that there is an absolutely identical you being held
> >> in an Earth-like simulated city near Sirius. It ought to matter
> >> to you that one of them is going to shortly die.
> > I agree that there are two separate subjects, but I don't agree that
> > it matters if one of them dies. This is because, if you're the one
> > that dies, it will seem to you that you continue to live in the one
> > that survives.
> Naturally, I oppose the construction "if you are the one that dies"
> because I consider you to be both of them. As you know, I
> think that it's possible to be in two places at the same time,
> just as it's possible to be at two times in the same place. (We
> simply need to get used to the idea.)
I'm a bit confused, because it seems you are saying that it matters if
your copy near Sirius dies but it doesn't matter if one of your copies
dies as during destructive teleportation (by which I meant what you
described except that the original disintegrates during the scan).
-- Stathis Papaioannou
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