Date: Wed Oct 06 2004 - 13:33:43 MDT
> > Metaqualia wrote:
> > I seem to have found a qualia based objective morality theory in
> > Elizier's Meaning of Life FAQ.
> > "If I had to point to the thing most likely to be meaningful, in all
> > the world, I would pick the conscious experience of pleasure. "
> > http://yudkowsky.net/tmol-faq/miscellaneous.html
> Elias Sinderson wrote:
> Funny, I see nothing objective or moral about that statement. As for
> qualia, well... Let me ask you this: Are you willing to simply equate
> qualia with objects of perception? By 'objects of perception' I am, of
> course, referring to those physical processes, whether internal or
> external, which can be perceived.
In agreement with the denial of MQ's insight, I'll add that besides the issue of whether an objective morality is plausible, it's possible (and likely) for that statement not to imply the notion of qualia at all. Although personal sensations can't be publicly observed with current technology, it doesn't necessarily follow that because only the corresponding chemical processes can be observed with current technology, personal sensations could never be. There's no experiential indication that the nature of a being couldn't borrow some nature of another being such that the latter's subjective sensations are the former's objective observation. If this is so, qualia need not be an elusive chimera or a source of inspiration for the moral realist to discover, as it were, an objective morality.
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